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ABSTRACT
One challenge in understanding the evolution of Internet in-
frastructure is the lack of systematic mechanisms for moni-
toring the extent to which allocated IP addresses are actually
used. In this paper we try to advance the science of infer-
ring IPv4 address space utilization by analyzing and corre-
lating results obtained through different types of measure-
ments. We have previously studied an approach based on
passive measurements that can reveal used portions of the
address space unseen by active approaches. In this paper,
we study such passive approaches in detail, extending our
methodology to four different types of vantage points, iden-
tifying traffic components that most significantly contribute
to discovering used IPv4 network blocks. We then combine
the results we obtained through passive measurements to-
gether with data from active measurement studies, as well as
measurements from BGP and additional datasets available to
researchers. Through the analysis of this large collection of
heterogeneous datasets, we substantially improve the state
of the art in terms of: (i) understanding the challenges and
opportunities in using passive and active techniques to study
address utilization; and (ii) knowledge of the utilization of
the IPv4 space.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, APNIC and RIPE exhausted their IP ad-
dress pools; the other Regional Internet Registries (RIR)
will likely exhaust their pools soon [22]. Running out
of the Internet address space has been anticipated for
decades, accompanied by intense debates over address
management policy, IPv6 transition, and IPv4 address
markets [27–29]. However, only one project has invested
considerable effort in attempting to measure how many
allocated addresses are actually being visibily used [25],
where used was defined as “directly responding to an
ICMP echo request”. (Answer: less than 4% of routed
addresses.) In this study our objective is to build on this
landmark work, by refining the definitions of used, and
extending the measurement methods to include other
types of data, including those that can reveal address
usage not visible to ICMP.
Figure 1 (explained in more detail in 3.1) taxonomizes
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Figure 1: IPv4 address space taxonomy. Nodes are labeled with
the estimated /24 population of each category (Section 7) and
the filter applied to arrive at the estimate (Sections 4 through 6).
addresses as IETF reserved [47] and usable, the latter
category we further classify according to whether they
are assigned to an organization, visible to the global
BGP interdomain routing system, and/or observably
sending traffic. We have developed a methodology to
measure and characterize IP address blocks per this
taxonomy, and we use active probing and passive traf-
fic measurement to distinguish between the lower left
leaves of the tree: used and unused address blocks.
Internet-wide active probing poses at least four chal-
lenges: 1) measurement overhead, 2) potential viola-
tion of acceptable usage policies triggering complaints
or blacklisting of the measurement infrastructure, 3)
measurement bias due to operational filtering of scan-
ning; and 4) inability to scale for use in a future IPv6
census. We recently showed [16] that passive measure-
ments from darknets and an academic network reveal
an additional ≈ 450K active /24 address blocks not
visibly active according to ICMP-based Internet census
measurement. However, passive measurements intro-
duce their own challenges, most notably the presence
of traffic using spoofed source IP addresses, which can
badly pollute estimates if not removed. In [16], we val-
idated our methodology on two sources of traffic data
available to us in 2012.
In this study, we first analyze the general applicabil-
ity of passive measurements to survey Internet address
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usage. We extend the methodology introduced in [16],
the most important aspect of which is removing spoofed
traffic, to work with four different types of networks and
measurement data: (i) full packet traces from a large
darknet; (ii) netflow logs from a national academic net-
work; (iii) sampled packet traces from a large IXP; (iv)
traffic classification logs from residential customers of
a European ISP. We analyze how inferences of active
address blocks can be influenced by characteristics spe-
cific to traffic observation vantage points, such as traffic
composition, size of the monitored address space, and
duration and time of the measurement. We found that
our VPs were reasonably robust to variations in these
characteristics: we observe a substantial fraction of ad-
dress space at all VPs or when observing from using
smaller fractions of address spaces (where we could test
that); and each VP saw a consistent number of /24
blocks over a two-year period.
After gaining confidence in our methodology, we used
seven passive and active measurement datasets collected
from July 2013 through Oct 2013 to perform the first
extended IPv4 Census using the taxonomy in Figure 1.
We compared our results to the state of the art repre-
sented by the ISI census [25] and found 718k previously
undiscovered used /24 blocks, an increase of 15.6% over
ISI. We also inferred used space from 98.9% of the ASes
announcing in BGP vs. 94.9% discovered by ISI, and
obtained a visible increase in intra-AS coverage (per-
AS percentage of BGP-announced /24 blocks inferred
as used).
Our results show that only 5.3M /24 blocks are used
(37% of usable IPv4 space), and that 3.4M assigned /24
blocks are not even visible in the global BGP routing
system. We analyze how unused space is distributed
across RIRs, countries, continents, and ASes. We in-
ferred that only 9.5% of the legacy /24 blocks are used
and that most unused address blocks are in the U.S.
Finally, we discuss how previous scientific studies of
Internet-related phenomena might change if they used
this extended dataset instead of other related data sets
to estimate the address space of ASes or countries.
Section 2 and Section 3 describe related work and
the datasets we use in our study. Section 4 explains
how we extract routed /24 address blocks from BGP
and registry data. Section 5 provides a detailed eval-
uation of our passive traffic methodology. Section 6
combines passive and active measurement approaches
to achieve unprecedented coverage in an IPv4 address
space survey. Section 7 characterizes the utilization of
the address space and Section 8 offers promising direc-
tions for applicability and extension of this work. We
will share all datasets we are allowed to release per the
AUP of their owners.
2. RELATED WORK
% /24s
0 20 40 60 80 100
# /24s
Figure 2: Our final inferences classified by RIR-allocated (and
legacy) address space. We identify legacy addresses per /8 [32],
but include some /8s that are presently administered by RIRs.
As is common knowledge, many legacy addresses are not used.
Huston [22,27–29] has provided a wealth of statistics
and projections related to IPv4 address space allocation
and announcement in global routing tables, although
he does not attempt to discern which routed addresses
are actually used (for any defintion). Meng et al. [48]
found that 90% of IPv4 prefixes allocated from 1997-
2004 appeared in the global routing system within 75
days.
With respect to measurement to evaluate actual ad-
dress usage, the landmark work is USC’s long-standing
effort [25], based on comprehensive ICMP probing of
the IPv4 space. Probing every routed IPv4 address
over ∼30 days, repeated multiple times between 2005
and 2007, they observed only 3.6% of allocated ad-
dresses responding [25]. In developing their method-
ology, they compared ICMP and TCP probing to pas-
sive traffic observation of USC addresses on USC’s own
campus network, finding 14% more USC IP addresses
visible to ICMP than to TCP, and 28% more USC IP
addresses visible to passive traffic observation than to
either ICMP or TCP active probing. But each method
observed some IP addresses missed by other methods.
We also found active and passive methods are able to
observe different subsets of addresses (Section 6), but
unlike [25], we use our passive monitors to infer usage
about the entire Internet instead of only hosts internal
to a network we monitor.
In 2013 Durumeric et al. [19] explored the system
challenges of active Internet-wide scanning in develop-
ing Zmap, a scanner that probes the entire IPv4 address
space in under 45 minutes from a single machine. Ac-
celerated scanning was also a goal of an Internet Census
illegally (and anonymously) performed in 2012 from a
botnet [26], although their methods were neither well-
documented nor validated [2].
Others have also explored the use of passive data to
estimate specific usage characteristics of IPv4 addresses.
Zander et al. [60] estimated the number of used IPv4
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addresses by applying a capture-recapture method for
estimating population sizes on active and passive mea-
surement logs of IP addresses collected from sources
such as web servers and spam blacklists. In contrast,
we also infer which IP addresses are unused. Bartlett
et al. [8] found that passive traffic observation and ac-
tive probing complemented each other for the purpose
of discovering active network services on campus.
Cai et al. [9] explores (and undertake several) po-
tential applications of clustering active probes to infer
address usage, including understanding how efficiently
individual address blocks are used, assessing the preva-
lence of dynamic address management, and distinguish-
ing low-bitrate from broadband edge links.
3. DATASETS
Table 1 lists characteristics of the datasets – collected
between July and October 2013 – from which we ex-
tracted /24 blocks and inferred attributes.1
3.1 Address Allocation and BGP Data
We analyzed BGP announcements captured by all
collectors (24 collectors peering with 184 peers) of the
Routeviews [3] and RIPE RIS [52] projects. For each
collector we took all routing tables (dumped every 2
hours by Routeviews and 8 hours by RIPE RIS) and
built per-day statistics for each peer. For each /24
block, we computed the maximum number of peers that
saw it reachable at any time within the full observation
period of 92 days.
To determine which address blocks are available for
assignment, we used a dataset compiled by Geoff Hus-
ton [23], which merges the extended delegation files
from the 5 RIRs [4, 6, 7, 41, 51] with IANA’s published
registries [31–36]. We classified as available any /24
blocks falling in address ranges in this data set that
were marked as either “available” (i.e., allocated to an
RIR but not yet assigned to an LIR or organization) or
“ianapool” (i.e., IANA has not allocated it to an RIR).
This data does not have LIR granularity, thus we con-
sidered any block allocated to an LIR as assigned (i.e.,
not available).
We labeled as rfc5735 all /24 blocks within network
ranges reserved by IETF (private networks, multicast,
etc.) [47].
3.2 Passive Data-plane Measurements
We apply our passive methodology for inferring used
/24 blocks to the following four vantage points (VP),
each of which retains traffic data in different formats
1We did not use reverse DNS PTR scans of the IPv4 space
for the same reasons articulated in [25], namely that many
active IP addresses lack DNS mappings, and many unused
IP addresses still have (obsolete) DNS mappings.
SWITCHIXP
residential ISPR-ISP
UCSD-NT
Figure 3: Our four traffic observation vantage points host dif-
ferent services and thus observe different workloads. They each
have their own format for storing traffic data (sampled and un-
sampled packets, NetFlow records, flow-level traffic classification
logs), requiring substantial effort to curate them for use in our
census (described in Section 5)
(Figure 3) and thus requires different approaches to fil-
tering for use in a census (Section 5).
SWITCH. We collected unsampled NetFlow records
from all the border routers of SWITCH, a national aca-
demic backbone network serving 46 single-homed uni-
versities and research institutes in Switzerland [55]. The
monitored address range of SWITCH contains 2.2 mil-
lion IP addresses, which correspond to a continuous
block slightly larger than a /11.
R-ISP. We collected per-flow logs from a vantage
point monitoring traffic of about 25,000 residential ADSL
customers of a major European ISP [21]. The VP is in-
strumented to run Tstat, an open source passive traffic
flow analyser [20] that stores transport-level statistics
of bidirectional flows, and uses internal network knowl-
edge to label flows as inbound or outbound.
UCSD-NT. We collected full packet traces from the
/8 network telescope operated at the University of Cal-
ifornia San Diego [1].
IXP. Our fourth VP is a large European IXP inter-
connecting more than 490 networks, exchanging more
than 400 PB monthly [5]. We have access to randomly
sampled (1 out of 16K) packets, capturing the first 128
bytes of each sampled Ethernet frame exchanged via
the public switching infrastructure of this IXP. A sam-
ple includes full Ethernet, network- and transport-layer
headers, along with a few payload bytes.
3.3 Active Measurements
ISI. We used the ISI Internet Census dataset it55w-
20130723 [37], obtained by probing the routed IPv4
address space with ICMP echo requests and retaining
only those probes that received an ICMP echo reply
from an address that matched the one probed (as rec-
ommended [38]). Note that the ISI Census experiment
was designed to report at a /32 (host) rather than /24
(subnet) granularity, but we apply the resulting data
set to a /24 granularity analysis.
HTTP. We extracted IP addresses from logs of Project
Sonar’s HTTP (TCP port 80) scan of the entire IPv4
address space on October 29, 2013 [24]. For each /24
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Dataset Source type Data format Period
UCSD-NT [1] Traffic: Darknet full pkt traces July 23 to August 25, 2013
SWITCH [55] Traffic: Live Academic Net. Netflow logs July 23 to August 25, 2013
IXP [5] Traffic: IXP sFlow packet samples July 8 to July 28, August 12 to September 8, 2013
R-ISP [21] Traffic: Residential ISP Tstat [20] logs from July 1 to September 31, 2013
ISI [37] Active Probing: ICMP ping logs July 23 to August 25, 2013
HTTP [24] Active Probing: HTTP GET logs October 29, 2013
ARK-TTL [30] Active Probing: traceroute logs July to September, 2013
BGP [3, 52] BGP announcements RIBs July to September, 2013
Available Blocks [23] IANA/RIRs IP ranges October 1, 2013
NetAcuity Edge [18] IP Geolocation IP ranges July 2013
prefix2AS [10] BGP announcements prefix to ASN July 2013
Table 1: We infer used /24 blocks from passively collected traffic (UCSD-NT, SWITCH, IXP, R-ISP) and active probing (ISI, HTTP,
ARK-TTL). The remaining datasets are used to infer both usable and routed prefixes, or label prefixes according to geolocation and AS.
block, we stored how many IP addresses responded to
an HTTP GET query from the scan.
Ark-TTL. We processed ICMP traceroutes performed
by CAIDA’s Archipelago to each /24 in the routed IPv4
address space between July and September 2013 [30].
Specifically, in order to add a third type of active prob-
ing data, we extracted the ICMP Time Exceeded replies
sent by hops along the traceroute path.
3.4 Mapping to ASes and Countries
To establish a mapping from /24 block to ASN, we
merged all CAIDA’s Routeviews Prefix to AS [10] map-
pings files for July 2013. For each /24 in the IPv4 ad-
dress space, we identified the set of overlapping prefixes
and chose the most specific. We found 116k /24s (out
of more than 10M) that mapped to multiple ASNs (due
to multi-origin ASes and AS sets), which we omitted
from our per-AS computations (Sections 6 and 7).
We geolocated each /24 block using Digital Element’s
NetAcuity Edge [18] database from 6 July 2013. For
each /24, we identified the unique set of country codes
to which overlapping blocks map. We found 27k /24s
(out of more than 14M) that map to multiple countries,
which we excluded from the geographic visualization in
Section 7.
4. UN/ROUTED AND UN/ASSIGNED SPACE
Which address blocks can we consider globally routed?
Of the unrouted space, which is assigned vs. available?
To distinguish legitimately routed address blocks from
those that appear routed due to misconfigurations or
hijacking, we consider a /24 block as routed only if cov-
ered by a prefix visible by at least 10 BGP peers. RIPE
recommends this threshold [58], which we believe is rea-
sonable since it removed 99.93% of the /24 blocks we
previously determined are available or reserved by IETF
(Section 3.1 and Figure 1) and thus could not be legit-
imately routed via BGP. Applying this threshold, also
excludes another 4.1M /24 blocks that we would have
otherwise labeled (likely incorrectly) as routed. We also
filter out any other /24 blocks known to be in the avail-
able category (i.e., not assigned), even if observed by
more than 10 peers. Our filtering yields 10.4M routed
/24 blocks that we must further classify as used or un-
used.
Of the 4.1M unrouted /24 blocks (those we cannot ob-
serve in BGP), we know that .7M are available and thus
unassigned, which leaves 3.4M /24 blocks that are as-
signed to organizations (many of whom announce other
IPv4 address space) and yet not routed. In other words,
≈53 /8’s worth of address space are not used for
the purpose of global BGP reachability.
5. ANALYSIS OF PASSIVE TRAFFIC
How can we effectively extend our previous method-
ology [16] to different types of traffic?
We build on our initial methodology [16] that we used
to analyze traffic captured in 2012 at two of the four
VPs described in Section 3.2 and Figure 3 (SWITCH
and UCSD-NT). We extended this method to work with
the fundamentally different types of traffic collected at
the other two VPs (R-ISP and IXP), specially how to fil-
ter out spoofed traffic (Section 5.1). We then evaluated
the impact on our inferences of varying aspects of the
vantage points: traffic composition size of monitored
address space, and duration and times of measurement
(Section 5.2).
5.1 Removing spoofed traffic
The main challenge in curating traffic data for use
in a census is to remove spoofed traffic from the data
sets, since it can severely distort estimates of address
utilization. Since the R-ISP data retains bidirectional
flow information and is guaranteed to see both direc-
tions of every flow, filtering out spoofed traffic is easy.
For the IXP, the sampled data collection and the fre-
quently asymmetric traffic flow (i.e., only one direction
of a flow may traverse the IXP) mean that we can-
not use the obvious and most reliable technique to infer
spoofed traffic (i.e., failed TCP flow completion, vari-
ants of which we use for R-ISP and SWITCH data).
Indeed, the IXP data sees only one packet for the vast
majority of flows. The IXP traffic data also introduces
a new challenge: filtering out packets with potentially
unused destination addresses (e.g., scanning packets).
Although each VP’s data set requires its own tech-
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Vantage Original Traffic After Applying Heuristics
Point /24 blocks Unrouted Dark /24 blocks Unrouted Dark
UCSD-NT 10,884,504 1,284,219 (31.6%) D-SWITCH: 4,553 (90.9%) 3,152,067 2,123 (0.05%) D-SWITCH: 2 (0.04%)
SWITCH 4,679,233 35,585 (0.69%) UCSD-NT: 429 (0.68%) 3,599,558 178 (0.004%) UCSD-NT: 0 (0.00%)
R-ISPa 5,233,871 344,188 (8.5%) UCSD-NT: 7,287 (11.6%) 3,797,544 271 (0.006%) UCSD-NT: 0 (0.00%)
IXP 14,461,947 4,068,232 (78.5%) UCSD-NT: 62,838 (100%) 3,091,021 376 (0.009%) UCSD-NT: 3 (0.004%)
Table 2: For each VP, we report the absolute number and percentage of all /24 blocks that are unrouted. For the dark category (4th
and 7th column), we use the /24 blocks of SWITCH that did not generate bidirectional flows (D-SWITCH) to evaluate UCSD-NT, and
the addresses monitored by UCSD-NT to evaluate all other VPs. Applying our heuristics reduces the number of unrouted /24 blocks
and dark /24 blocks at all VPs.
a Tstat automatically discards TCP flows not completing the 3-way handshake. Our heuristics only remove UDP flows.
nique, we tune and validate each technique using the
same assumption: packets appearing to originate from
[or destined to] unrouted blocks are potentially spoofed
[or scanning] packets. As an additional source of vali-
dation, we compare our results at the SWITCH, R-ISP,
and IXP VPs against network blocks that we know to
be unused, i.e., the dark /24 blocks in the UCSD-NT
address space 2 (62,838 /24 blocks). To validate our es-
timates of spoofed traffic at the UCSD-NT VP, we use
the /24 blocks from SWITCH that we infer to be dark
because they did not generate a single bidirectional flow
in the whole observation period (5,003 /24 blocks). We
use these data only with UCSD-NT because their ob-
servation periods exactly match.
5.1.1 SWITCH (academic network)
To filter spoofed traffic, we use the same heuristic we
introduced in [16], which extracts from Netflow records
bidirectional TCP flows with at least 5 packets and 80
bytes per packet on average. We performed a sensitivity
analysis on these thresholds in [16], and found that they
diminish the probability that the remote IP address is
spoofed. Using this heuristic leads us to infer as used
only 0.004% and 0% of the unrouted and the UCSD-NT
/24 blocks, respectively (Table 2).
5.1.2 R-ISP (residential ADSL ISP)
Unlike the other traffic data sources, the R-ISP’s use
of Tstat automatically removes essentially all spoofed
traffic, since to be logged a TCP flow must complete
the 3-way handshake. For UDP traffic, we extracted
only bidirectional flows initiated locally with at least 1
packet with payload transmitted in both directions.
5.1.3 UCSD-NT: (a large darknet)
In [16] we looked deeply into several spoofing events
to derive filters that would allow us to filter such events
from darknet traffic in general. Two phenomena that
we found to be indicators of a spoofing event were: (i)
spikes in the numbers of both unrouted and overall /24
blocks per hour, and (ii) traffic using the same ports
and protocols with a high fraction of unrouted source
2Some addresses within this “darknet” are actually used and
their traffic is not collected.
Filter Type Total /24s Unrouted
TTL> 200 and not ICMP 10,588,879 1,278,027
Least signif. byte
src addr 0
45,382 7
Least signif. byte
src addr 255
444,346 6,691
Non-traditional Protocol 56,502 2,209
Same Src. and Dst. Addr. 96 0
No TCP Flags 3,449 638
UDP Without Payload 545 114
All Specific Filters 10,587,049 1,280,826
Table 3: Types of spoofed traffic observed at UCSD-NT. Many
types of spoofing were also observed in our 2012 study [16].
/24 blocks. We derived heuristics to filter the most re-
curring spoofing behavior (Table 3), plus some specific
large spoofing events (grouped in the table as “All Spe-
cific Filters”). Many types of spoofing observed in our
2012 study [16] were also present in 2013. In addition,
we added two filters: TCP packets with no flags set and
UDP packets without payload.
After applying our filters, we observe more than 3
million /24 blocks. Table 2 shows that our filtering
heuristics reduce traffic appearing to originate from un-
routed or dark networks to around 0.05% (compared
to 31.6% and 90.9% unrouted and dark blocks, respec-
tively, before filtering).
5.1.4 IXP (large IXP)
For the IXP, we considered only TCP traffic and dis-
carded TCP packets with the SYN flag set, which re-
duced the number of observably used /24s from 14.4M
to 5.7M /24s. We then used a heuristic that tries to
filter out /24s observed as used only due to spoofing
noise. This heuristics is based on the number of pack-
ets and average packet size from and to a given /24
block. The first heuristic imposes a trade-off between
false positives and false negatives: if we set the thresh-
old high enough, we are more likely to filter out /24s
that contain only IP addresses being used in spoofed
source address packets. But we will also lose many le-
gitimately used /24 blocks, especially since we only have
1:16K sampled packet data in to begin with. The aver-
age packet size threshold complements the packet count
threshold by increasing the likelihood of retaining /24s
that are actually exchanging TCP payload.
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The left plot in Figure 4a shows the number of un-
routed blocks that we inferred as used based on source
addresses of the sampled packets (the darker the color
the higher the number of unrouted blocks, log scale).
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(a) Effect of thresholding: unrouted /24 blocks according to
minimum number of packets (x-axis) and minimum average
packet size requirements (left). Dark /24s inferred as used for
DST addresses (right).
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(b) Trade off between introduced error (unrouted /24s, dark
/24s) and the number of /24s inferred as used.
Figure 4: IXP: Selection of used /24s.
Interestingly, we see almost no packets in the IXP
data set destined to unrouted /24 blocks, perhaps be-
cause there are no default routes advertised across BGP
peering (vs. transit) sessions at the IXP, so only explic-
itly routed addresses will be observed as destinations.
We can still use dark but routed destination addresses
as indicators of scanning traffic; the right plot in Figure
4a shows the number of dark /24 blocks inferred as used
when considering the destination addresses of packets.
The average packet size is highly efficient at removing
canning traffic.
To find an appropriate combination of thresholds,
Figure 4b plots an ROC-like curve that shows the num-
ber of /24 blocks inferred as used (y axis) against the
percentage of unrouted (for source addresses) and num-
ber of dark (destination addresses) /24 blocks. For a
given requirement (e.g., “less than 0.1% unrouted”), we
find the combination of thresholds (minimum number of
packets and minimum average packet size) that results
in the largest set of used /24 blocks.
To keep the error in our inference low, we consider
a very conservative threshold (as shown as the dashed
R-ISP Traffic Class /24 Blocks Unique Volume
P2Pa 3,172,439 (91.2%) 610,438 34.1%
Teredo 914,533 (26.3%) 1,467 1.4%
VoIP (RTP,RTCP) 892,488 (25.7%) 3,619 0.5%
HTTP/HTTPS 234,586 (6.8%) 20,274 57.7%
Otherb 196,503 (5.7%) 62,406 1.9%
Unknownc 2,691,300 (77.4%) 115,869 4.5%
Table 4: At the R-ISP VP, P2P traffic contributes almost 3.2M
/24 blocks, including 610K unique. HTTP/HTTPS is a smaller
component, despite accounting for 57.7% of the volume.
aeMule, ED2K, KAD, BitTorrent, PPLive, SopCast,
TVAnts, and PPStream
bDNS, POP3, SMTP, IMAP4, XMPP, MSN, RTMP, SSH
cFlows unmatched by the classification engines.
vertical lines in Figure 4b) and select used /24s from the
SRC and DST addresses independently. The resulting
numbers are depicted in Table 2.3 Our antispoofing ap-
proach is efficient, reducing the number of unrouted and
dark /24s dramatically, even for sampled traffic. Nev-
ertheless, we point out that the number of used /24s
directly depends on the thresholds applied and that
the false-negative rate increases with more conservative
thresholds. Hence, we likely miss used /24s with our
current threshold selection.
We found similar behavior with UDP (as TCP) but
we needed to set thresholds more conservatively, par-
ticularly for average packet size. We did not include
UDP-based inferences in our final dataset, since the ad-
ditional gain in terms of /24s was not significant com-
pared given our lower confidence in the inferences.
5.2 Effect of vantage points characteristics: traf-
fic, network address segment, duration
After filtering spoofed traffic to the best of our ability,
we analyzed the impact of four characteristics specific to
a given vantage point on the number of /24s observed:
traffic characteristics, size of address space monitored,
and duration or specific time of monitoring. We found
that our VPs were reasonably robust to variations in
these characteristics, i.e, we observe a substantial frac-
tion of address space at all VPs or when observing from
smaller fractions of the address spaces (where we could
test that), and each VP saw a consistent number of /24
blocks over a two-year period.
5.2.1 Influential Traffic Components
How do traffic characteristics specific to a VP influ-
ence its contribution to the inferences?
Characterizing traffic at our VPs assists with two ob-
jectives: (i) highlighting how the VP contributes to the
census; and (ii) ensuring that traffic components spe-
cific to a VP do not skew our findings or make them
not generally applicable. That is, to legitimately use
3Note that blocks inferred by the source heuristic may also
introduce dark /24s.
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Darknet Traffic Class /24 Blocks Unique
BitTorrent 2,210,257 (70.2%) 321,474
Encrypteda 1,349,578 (42.8%) 34,290
UDP 0x31 1,343,911 (42.7%) 115,951
Other P2P (eDonkey,QQLive) 834,657 (26.5%) 5,361
Encapsulated IPv6 (Teredo,6to4) 745,092 (23.7%) 11,322
Conficker 604,877 (19.2%) 61,836
Backscatter 388,095 (12.3%) 53,277
Scanning (non-Conficker)b 194,649 (6.2%) 4,269
Other 2,038,150 (64.7%) 143,066
Table 5: At UCSD-NT, BitTorrent traffic contributes the most
/24 blocks, instead of activities traditionally observed in darknets
(scanning, Conficker, backscatter).
aPackets where entropy(payload) ≈ log2 len(payload).
bMeeting Bro’s definition of a scanner: sent same proto-
col/port packets to at least 25 destinations in 5 minutes [57].
passive traffic data for a census, we need to convince
ourselves that a given VP is not observing a special set
of /24 blocks. Fortunately for our purpose, we found
that the number of /24s we inferred did not vary dra-
matically across VPs with substantially different traffic
compositions. (We could not analyze traffic composi-
tion from the IXP due to the sampled packet capture.)
SWITCH. SWITCH hosts many popular services
that attract end users to the monitored address space,
including: a website hosting medical information, a Source-
Forge mirror, PlanetLab nodes, university web pages,
and mail servers. The most popular service at SWITCH,
the medical information website, exchanged traffic with
hosts in 1.8M /24 blocks; however, all other IP ad-
dresses in SWITCH combined to capture 96.7% of all
3.6M blocks observed by SWITCH. The top 100 services
in SWITCH each observe over 70K /24 blocks, and col-
lectively contribute 91.2% of the /24 blocks observed at
this VP. Compared to the UCSD-NT and R-ISP van-
tage points, SWITCH’s value as a VP depends more on
these popular IP addresses. If SWITCH did not host
its top 1000 most popular IP addresses, (i.e., the top
services), it would observe only 69.9% of the /24 blocks
it otherwise observes, compared to 89.7% and 97.5% at
R-ISP and UCSD-NT respectively.
R-ISP. Table 4 aggregates the Tstat-identified traf-
fic categories observed at R-ISP into five traffic com-
ponents accounting for 97% of /24 blocks observed at
the ISP. While HTTP and HTTPS account for 57.7% of
the traffic volume, they contribute only 6.8% of the /24
blocks observed at the VP. Instead, the largest source
of /24 blocks comes from client-to-client communication
(e.g., P2P and VoIP). P2P is a key contributor, as 610k
/24 blocks are only observable through P2P traffic.
UCSD-NT. The non-uniform nature of darknet traf-
fic is well-known [14,59], but our 2012 study of UCSD-
NT and a darknet of comparable size observed a simi-
lar number of /24 blocks in a 34 day study (3.14M vs
2.98M) [16]. Surprisingly, P2P also plays a key role at
the UCSD-NT VP, where we observe 2.2M /24 blocks
(357k unique) from traffic with a BitTorrent payload
(see Table 5), probably caused by index poisoning at-
tacks [42]. To a lesser extent, networks with end users
are exposed through malware-infected hosts (e.g., Con-
ficker and scanning). Alternatively, the backscatter traf-
fic (a result of a spoofed DoS attack) reveals networks
likely hosting services. Two classes (UDP 0x314 and
Encrypted) are of unknown purpose.
5.2.2 Impact of Vantage Point Size
What is the effect of vantage point size?
Analyzing the effect of vantage point size on the num-
ber of /24 blocks observed is not straightforward due to
the non-uniform nature of the monitored address space.
Notwithstanding the extraordinary popularity of some
IP addresses, as well as non-uniform assignment of hosts
within an address subnet, we found an interesting cor-
relation: the median number of /24 blocks observed is
roughly proportional to the log of the number of mon-
itored IP addresses. Consistent with this observation,
the marginal utility of monitoring an additional IP ad-
dress declines as the size of the vantage point increases,
as expected.
5.2.3 Impact of Time
How does the duration or time of collection affect the
inference of which /24s are used?
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Figure 5: The cumulative number of /24 blocks observed grows
logarithmically at each vantage point.
Figure 5 shows the logarithmic but varied growth of
the number of /24 blocks collected over time for our
four VPs. SWITCH, which initially captures the fewest
/24 blocks has the fastest growth rate; while the R-
ISP and IXP VPs capture more /24 blocks initially but
they grow more slowly. Other factors that can influence
inferences are strong changes in traffic composition, e.g.,
flash events. Our traffic data sets all had low (max 2%)
standard deviation in the number of /24 blocks observed
per week, with no abnormal events observed.
4A 58-byte with payload mostly 0x00 and ninth byte set
to 0x31. The most common destination port (39455) is ob-
served but unclassified in [15,53].
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Figure 6: In our data, taken over two years, every VP observed at
least 2.6M /24 blocks per month. SWITCH, R-ISP and the IXP
show little variation in the number of /24 blocks captured by the
VP per month, while UCSD-NT observes significant differences
due to changes in IBR composition.
However, when observing measurements from a broader
time frame, we found evidence of flash events and changes
in traffic. For example, in August 2012 (the year before
our study), SWITCH web sites hosting content about
shark protection experienced a sharp increase in visits
(and thus observed /24 blocks); the Discovery Chan-
nel’s Shark Week aired that month. Figure 6 shows per-
month sample measurements using our methodology
over a period of two years. All vantage points except
UCSD-NT observed a similar number of /24 blocks per
month. At UCSD-NT, changes in IBR composition re-
sulted in a corresponding increase in visible /24 blocks.
Specifically, (i) in July 2012, there was an increase in
BitTorrent traffic; (ii) in March 2013, there was a large
increase in the darknet’s backscatter category, possibly
related to the DDoS attacks on Spamhaus [50]. Such
events may bring additional data but note that for the
last two years each VP consistently observes over 3M
/24s.
6. COMBINING ACTIVE AND PASSIVE
In this section, we first combine our seven datasets
obtained from active and passive measurements to break
down the routed node in Figure 1 into used and routed
unused categories (we filtered all the datasets used in
this section to include only /24 blocks marked as routed
according to Section 4). We then compare our results
to the state of the art represented by the ISI census
(Section 6.2).
6.1 Active vs Passive
What are the respective contributions and limitations
of active and passive measurements? Are passive mea-
surements from multiple VPs useful?
The top half of Table 6 shows the number of /24
blocks discovered by each active approach and their
unique contribution. The large number of /24 blocks
found by ISI and HTTP, and their distinct contribu-
tions within the set of active measurements, are un-
surprising because we know that ICMP and TCP port
80 probing are among the most effective active probing
methods that capture different but overlapping popu-
lations [25, 46]. More interesting is the 40k additional
/24 blocks that we obtain from the Ark dataset; we
speculate that routers may be sending TTL exceeded
packets using a source address from what they use in
ICMP echo responses.
Dataset # /24s # Unique /24s # Unique /24s
within among active
same family + passive
Active
ISI 4,589,213 1,319,283 398,334
HTTP 3,161,064 189,831 76,189
Ark-TTL 1,627,363 40,284 24,533
Subtotal 4,837,056
Passive
SWITCH 3,599,380 147,220 54,905
UCSD-NT 3,149,944 61,443 24,134
R-ISP 3,797,273 176,721 59,278
IXP 3,090,645 195,328 55,155
Subtotal 4,468,096
Total 5,306,935
Table 6: Each data set used to infer address space utilization
offers a unique contribution. Unrouted /24 blocks are not repre-
sented here. The third column is the number of /24s observed in
the data set that were not also observed in the (top) other active
data sets or (bottom) other passive data sets; the fourth column
is the number /24s observed that were not observed in any other
data set. The final total is the number of /24s we infer as used
(lower left node of tree in Figure 1).
The bottom half of Table 6) compares the contribu-
tion of our passive measurements. The merged results
from our four passive VPs do not entirely cover the
set observed by active measurements, missing about
840k /24 blocks. However, the same data includes 470k
/24 blocks not observed through active measurements,
demonstrating the value of combining active and pas-
sive datasets.
Each passive vantage point offers a unique contribu-
tion, shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 6,
suggesting that these measurements are not exhaustive
and that using more vantage points would improve the
coverage. In particular, when we examine the portion
of the address space observed exclusively by passive ap-
proaches (470k /24 blocks, not shown in the table), we
find that only 17% of it was visible by all four vantage
points, while ≈ 41% came from the sum of each unique
contribution (4th column in Table 6).
Since 3 out of 4 vantage points are in Europe, we test
for the possibility of geographical bias in the passive
measurements. Table 7 shows the percent increase of
/24 blocks discovered by merged passive+active data
vs. active measurements alone. The larger increase
in European coverage vs. other continents (middle col-
umn) is consistent with a slight bias from to the Euro-
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% of newly per-continent
discovered % increase
/24 blocks of /24 blocks
Europe 32.44% 11.11%
North America 26.54% 9.08%
Asia 25.31% 7.64%
South America 8.56% 10.85%
Africa 4.65% 30.18%
Oceania 4.33% 29.24%
Table 7: Absence of significant geographical bias in passive vs
active measurements: of the number of /24 blocks discovered by
passive approaches and not seen by active ones, a slight larger
portion geolocated to Europe (where 3 of our 4 passive VP are).
But on a per-continent basis (right colum), the increase is more
even across continents (Southern continents have little address
space so any increase will be relatively large in percentage terms.)
pean vantage points, but on a per-continent basis the
marginal increase spreads more easily across continents
(right column, noting that the lower three continents
have so much less address space that any increase will
be relatively large in percentage terms.)
We also explored why so much space is discovered
by the active but not the passive measurement in our
data sets. Perhaps our heuristics to remove spoofed
traffic are too conservative and remove much legitimate
traffic. Also, for IXP and SWITCH, we included only
TCP traffic which could have limited our view; curating
UDP and other traffic (removing spoofed and scanning
traffic) is future work.
# VPs # ISI-special /24s # single-IP /24s
without ISI-special
0 94,266 58,132
1 13,057 19,414
2 9,674 19,115
3 4,959 27,185
4 2,465 13,091
Table 8: Most /24 blocks with only a single IP address ending in
.0, .1, .255 are not observed by any of our passive measurements
(first row and middle column). In contrast, if a /24 had only a
single responding address ending in another octet, it was more
likely to be observed sending traffic (3rd column). We conclude
that /24s represented in the middle column likely do not send
traffic to the public Internet.
Our results also reveal large fractions of IPv4 space
visible only by active measurements that do not gen-
erate traffic on the public Internet, shedding doubt on
whether they are really “used” for the purpose of global
BGP reachability. In particular, we found most /24
blocks from the ISI dataset with a single responding ad-
dress whose last octet was 0, 1, or 255 (the “isi special”
column) were not observed in our passive measurements.
Table 8 shows the distribution of the number of pas-
sive vantage points that saw such /24 blocks (2nd col-
umn), as well as all /24s in the ISI data that had only a
single non-special responding IP address (3rd column).
Many of these blocks were not visible to any of our van-
tage points during the observation periods (Table 8, 1st
row), including the vast majority of the “isi special” /24
blocks. The progression from /24 blocks observed by
1 to 4 VPs shows a rapid decay for “isi special” blocks
(middle column), while there is almost no trend for /24s
in the right column. We conclude that /24s represented
in the middle column likely do not send traffic to the
public Internet.
We manually investigated other cases of network blocks
only visible to active probing, identifying special cases
that suggest absence of traffic on the public Internet,
including clusters of /24 blocks apparently used as in-
ternal CDNs by large service providers. We plan a more
thorough investigation of this behavior as future work.
The last row of Table 6 shows the final number (5.3M)
of /24 blocks we infer as used combining our 7 active
and passive datasets (leftmost leaf in Figure 1). We sub-
tract this from the total amount of BGP-routed space
(10.4M) to arrive at an estimate of 5.1M routed un-
used /24 blocks, an impressive quantity of un-
used but BGP-reachable IPv4 space.
6.2 Coverage
What is the improvement of our combined approach
to infer utilization in the routed space with respect to
the state of the art (ISI census)?
We consider the ISI Census [25] to be the state of
the art in inferring address space utilization within the
routed space. Since there is no ground truth available
about which routed space is actually utilized, we present
our results in terms of additional IPv4 space coverage
we obtain when combining our 7 datasets (which in-
clude ISI). We consider coverage at three different lev-
els: (i) the percentage of routed /24 blocks inferred as
used (global coverage); (ii) the percentage of ASes an-
nouncing the /24 blocks inferred as used out of the ASes
that announce at least one BGP prefix (44628 ASes)
(AS-level coverage); (iii) for each AS, the percentage of
routed /24 blocks inferred as used (intra-AS coverage).
AS-level coverage is the only case in which we expect
the upper bound to approximate ground truth (i.e., it
is reasonable to assume that an AS announcing prefixes
on BGP uses at least one /24 block).
We found 718k previously undiscovered used /24 blocks
(difference between last and 1st row of Table 6), bring-
ing global coverage from 44% to 51%. Figure 7 shows
that adding just a single dataset can greatly improve the
global coverage. As we include our additional datasets,
there is considerable amount of overlap. If we were to
include additional measurements of used address space,
the actual number of /24 blocks would be highly depen-
dent on the quality and diversity of the datasets. How-
ever, if we consider the logarithmic trend suggested by
our observations, increasing the number of additional
datasets from 6 to 12 would result in approximately
200k more /24 blocks.
Our AS-level coverage is 98.9% versus 94.9% found
by ISI. We manually analyzed whois and BGP data for
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Figure 7: We improve the global coverage of ISI (0 additional
datasets) by considering ISI + any number of our datasets. The
actual number of /24 blocks observed are shown in red, and the
seemingly logarithmic trend is shown in blue.
the 489 ASes for which we did not infer a single used
/24 block. We found that 37 ASes associated with U.S.
military organizations accounted for 79% of the (17080)
/24 blocks advertised by these 489 unobserved ASes.
We suspect such networks do not transmit ICMP, TCP
or UDP traffic over the public Internet (but they may
be tunneling traffic using, e.g., IPSEC, which we did not
capture in our passive measurements.) The vast major-
ity of the remaining ASes (399 out of 452) announce 10
or fewer /24 blocks.
Figure 8 shows the intra-AS coverage obtained with
our combined approach as a function of results obtained
by ISI (the graph is sorted by increasing ISI intra-AS
coverage, with bins of 2%). The bottom graph shows
the number of ASes per bin. In the top graph, the bot-
tom grey bar represents the minimum intra-AS cover-
age obtained by ISI for the ASes in the bin, whereas the
remaining 4 (colored) bars refer to the intra-AS cover-
age obtained by our combined approach (which includes
ISI). Each of these 4 bars represents a quartile of the
ASes in the bin. For a given bar, its bottom and top
show on the y axis, respectively, the lower and upper
bound of the coverage we obtain for such ASes. For ex-
ample, in the first bin, the bar from the median to the
upper quartile shows intra-AS coverage between 23%
and 100%. The graph shows visible increments across
the whole x axis (decreasing as ISI intra-AS coverage
approaches 100%). This result shows that even for ASes
which responded to ISI’s pings (x! = 0), our additional
datasets reveal new /24 blocks (i.e., ASes do not exhibit
a uniform behavior across their used subnets with re-
spect to ICMP echo requests). In most of the bins, for
half of the ASes (i.e., two bottom quartiles) we obtain a
few percentage point increase. The two upper quartiles
show more significant increments, e.g., up to x = 20, for
ASes in the upper quartile we see about 20% more /24
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Figure 8: Comparing the intra-AS coverage of our combined ap-
proach (“Used”) against ISI’s. The graph is sorted by increasing
intra-AS coverage in ISI’s data, with bins of 2%. The bottom
graph shows the number of ASes per bin. In the top graph,
the bottom grey bar represents the minimum intra-AS coverage
obtained by ISI for ASes in the bin, whereas the remaining 4 (col-
ored) bars refer to the intra-AS coverage obtained by our com-
bined approach (which includes ISI data). Each of these 4 bars
represents a quartile of the ASes in the bin. For each bar, its bot-
tom and top show on the y axis, respectively, the lower and upper
bound of the coverage we obtain for ASes in that quartile (e.g.,
in the first bin, the bar from the median to the upper quartile
shows intra-AS coverage between 23% and 100%).
blocks (at least). The first bin shows different behav-
ior, with at least 25% of ASes covered entirely by our
method (although most of these ASes announce only
one /24).
SWITCH is the only AS for which we can derive bet-
ter reference data (rather than simply using the 100%
upper bound): from 23 July to 25 August 2013, all 9,271
/24 blocks within SWITCH were announced in BGP,
but only 49% of these blocks generated bidirectional
flows. Assuming these are the only used /24 blocks
in SWITCH, we should not infer an intra-AS coverage
above 49% for this AS (instead of considering 100% of
the routed /24 blocks according to our definition of up-
per bound). ISI’s inferred 20.9% intra-AS coverage for
this AS; our combined approach (without data from the
SWITCH VP) reached 33.1%. Still almost 16% of the
used blocks of the AS were not discovered by our ap-
proach, showing space for further improvement. How-
ever, for all other ASes we would include the SWITCH
VP in our analysis, potentially resulting in a higher
intra-AS coverage.
7. IPV4 CENSUS 2013
How is used/unused and available space distributed
across RIRs, ASes, countries and continents? Which
ASes or countries make the worst use of the space they
have been assigned? Would previous scientific studies
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of Internet-related phenomena change if they used this
dataset instead of other related data sets?
Finally, we examine IPv4 address space utilization
from the perspective of our inferences. We emphasize
that our inferences do not provide complete coverage of
the used IPv4 address space, but it is the first dataset
which includes ASes and network blocks that do not
reply to ICMP probing. All our data is from approx-
imately the same period (from July 2013 through Oct
2013). We assume that usage of the address space does
not change significantly within a period of 4 months.
Figure 9 illustrates a Hilbert map of IPv4 address
space utilization based on our results, taxonomized in
Figure 1. The IETF reserved space accounts for 2.3M
address blocks, or 13.7% of the entire IPv4 address
space (blue). The remaining usable 14.5M address blocks
consist of 5.3M (37%) used (red), 5.1M (35%) routed un-
used (grey), 3.4M (23%) unrouted assigned (black), and
0.7M (5%) available (green). Out of the 4.1M unrouted
/24 blocks (Figure 1), 3.4M /24 blocks are assigned
to organizations and yet not routed. These numbers
are striking and suggest revisiting the topic of IPv4 ad-
dress depletion. First, an enormous amount of IPv4 ad-
dress space is assigned to organizations that do not even
announce it on the BGP plane (i.e., there is no need
to perform inference through additional active/passive
measurements to sketch this phenomenon). In addition,
since we verified that several of these organizations an-
nounce on BGP other address blocks they have been
assigned, such number also suggests that our inference
of large unutilization of routed space is realistic.
Figure 2 classifed IPv4 addresses by their RIR region,
or as legacy addresses if they were allocated before the
RIR system began. Legacy addresses were allocated by
the central Internet Registry prior to the RIRs primar-
ily to military organizations and large corporations such
as IBM, AT&T, Apple. Some of this space is now ad-
ministered by individual RIRs. We use the IANA IPv4
address space registry [39], which marks legacy space
and its designation at a /8 granularity. In Figure 2,
we observe that the set of legacy routed unused and un-
routed assigned addresses are similar in size (5.1M /24s)
to the entire used address space (5.3M /24s). 42% of the
usable address blocks are legacy; these blocks are more
lightly utilized (9.5% of the legacy) and include more
unrouted assigned (45% of the legacy) addresses than
the RIRs (56% and 7.7% of the RIR address blocks, re-
spectively). ARIN, RIPE, APNIC, and LACNIC have
50%, 65%, 54% and 68% of their address blocks used,
respectively, in contrast to AFRINIC which has fewer
of their blocks used (31%) and many more available
(38%) address blocks than other RIRs (6.7% of other
RIR addresses are available).
Table 9 lists the top-5 continents and countries in un-
used and unrouted assigned /24s. 52.2% of the unused
Figure 9: Hilbert map visualization showing the utilization of
the address space according to our taxonomy. The IPv4 address
space is rendered in two dimensions using a space-filling contin-
uous fractal Hilbert curve of order 12 [49, 54]. Each pixel in
the full-resolution image [11] represents a /24 block; red indi-
cates used blocks, green unassigned blocks, and blue RFC special
blocks. Routed unused blocks are grey and unrouted assigned
black.
space and 72% of unrouted assigned space is in North
America, primarily in the U.S., where most legacy allo-
cations (which are only 9.5% used, per Figure 2) were
made. Asia follows, with China owning 8.79% and 5.7%
of the global routed unused and unrouted assigned space,
respectively, and then Europe. Other continents (South
America, Oceania, and Africa) have between 0.93% and
2.13% of the global unused and unrouted assigned space.
We can also observe that the distribution of unrouted
assigned space is more skewed than routed unused space,
because 45% of legacy space is unrouted assigned, while
only 7.7% of the non-legacy space is unrouted assigned.
Figure 10 visually illustrates the per-country ratio of
assigned unused over assigned space, suggesting which
regions using space most and least efficiently. The U.S.
is red in this map due to a few very large allocations,
while some African countries are red because they use a
very small fraction of their (also small) assigned space.
Table 10 lists the top ASes by routed unused /24s (we
do not have per-AS data for unrouted assigned space).
The top ASes are the Department of Defense (DoD)
Network Information Center (NIC), followed by Level
3, HP, China Telekom, and finally UUNET.
Figure 11 compares address space assigned to coun-
tries to per-country population [13] and Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP - we used “purchasing power par-
ity” from CIA’s World Factbook [12]). We observe no-
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Top Continents
By Routed Unused /24s By Unrouted Assigned /24s
North America 52.2% North America 72.0%
Asia 22.3% Asia 13.1%
Europe 19.7% Europe 12.1%
South America 2.13% Oceania 0.97%
Oceania 1.92% Africa 0.93%
Top Countries
By Routed Unused /24s By Unrouted Assigned /24s
USA 49.8% USA 67.5%
China 8.79% China 5.70%
Japan 6.22% United Kingdom 5.39%
Germany 4.85% Japan 4.21%
South Korea 2.72% Canada 3.73%
Table 9: Top continents and countries in unused and unrouted
assigned /24s. North America and USA have a large fraction of
the assigned, but unused or unrouted address space.
Top ASes in unused /24s
AS Name & Number Routed Unused /24s (%)
DoD NIC (721) 190k (3.82%)
Level 3 (3356) 157k (3.16%)
HP (71) 126k (2.54%)
China Telecom (4134) 106k (2.13%)
UUNET (701) 105k (2.12%)
Table 10: Top ASes in routed unused /24s
table disparities between used /24s and population. For
example, USA, Australia, UK, Canada, and Germany
have 25%, 1.45%, 3.52%, 2.06% and 4.11% of the used
/24s, but only 4.44%, 0.31%, 0.89%, 0.49% and 1.13%,
respectively, of the population. In contrast, African
and Asian countries have 16% and 59% of the popu-
lation, but only 1.8% and 32%, respectively, of the used
/24s. Nevertheless, the per-country used /24s corre-
late much better with the distribution of GDP (0.960
correlation), than with population (0.517 correlation),
suggesting that economic inequalities could explain the
differences in the used /24s.
This type of census dataset also has implications for a
range of scientific research of the Internet, most notably
projects that incorporate routed address space metrics
into estimates of the size, degree, type, or malicious-
ness of ASes [17,40,44,45,56]. More accurate metrics of
address space usage could also potentially improve the
accuracy of analysis of (or prediction of likely future)
address blocks transfers in the grey market [43]. Figure
12 shows the overestimation error one would make by
using a canonical BGP-routed address space metric to
reflect how much address space an AS is actually ob-
servably using, for five types of network providers of
various sizes. Figure 13 shows the overestimation er-
ror when using the same (BGP-routed address space) to
reflect each country’s Internet footprint. Both figures
show that there is no simple formula to translate be-
tween routed address space and actually used address
space – the difference varies widely by AS.
8. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We presented a new methodology for performing an
Figure 10: Per-country percentage of unused space (routed unused
+ unrouted assigned) out of the assigned. The U.S. is red in this
map due to a few very large allocations heavily unutilized, while
some African countries are red because they use a very small
fraction of their (also small) assigned space.
Internet-wide census of IPv4 address space utilization.
Among the many results presented, we find that only
5.3M /24s address blocks are visibly used (37% of usable
/24 blocks), and that 3.4M assigned /24 blocks are not
even visible in the global BGP routing system.
In addition to the applications of census measure-
ments that have been well articulated by [9] (and sum-
marized in Section 2), there are many possible future
directions for this work. To improve the methodology,
we would like to further improve our ability to infer
spoofed traffic, and validate our inferences, perhaps by
responding to darknet traffic. We would also like to
investigate the use of UDP or other protocol traffic at
at R-ISP and IXP vantage points, and analyze in more
detail what addresses are less visible to traffic measure-
ment e.g., internal CDNs or quiet networks. As always,
additional vantage points and ground truth information
from operators would help improve the integrity of the
method.
For a periodic global Internet census that tracks changes
over time, we imagine a hybrid approach that first in-
fers active IP address blocks based on passive measure-
ments from one or more (live or dark) traffic vantage
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Figure 11: Comparison of address space assigned to countries with per-country population and GDP. The width of a country (and
continent) represents its relative size within a dataset. E.g., the top bar shows the percentage that each country contributes to the global
population, with China (cn) contributing the most (1.36B, 18.9%). The correlation between datasets can be observed by comparing
bars. We observe that there is not a strong correlation between population (top bar) and number of used /24 blocks of a country; in
large part due to high usage by the USA. There is however, a strong correlation between the GDP (2nd from top) and number of used
/24 blocks of a country (3rd bar). Not only does the USA dominate /24 block usage, it also represents a significant portion of both the
routed unused and unrouted assigned bars, with 49.8% and 67.5% respectively. An interactive version of this visualization is available
at [11].
points, then probes only those address blocks that can-
not be confidently inferred as active. This approach
could dramatically improve coverage over state of the
art methods, while minimizing measurement overhead
and potential irritation of network operators with ag-
gressive firewalls. Finally, the unscalability of active
scanning to the IPv6 address space was one motivation
to explore our hybrid apporach, but we do not know
how well distributed passive traffic observation alone
could effectively support a future IPv6 census.
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